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Early Korean Armies
From 850 to 1598, private armies were a critical feature of  Korean 
history.  They buttressed the military government of  the Ch’oe in the 
late 1100s, usurped the Koryo Dynasty to make way for the rise of  the 
Chosen in 1392, and fought the Japanese invasion forces of  Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi during the Imjin War (1592-1598).  They came from every 
facet of  Korean society: peasant resistance forces, retainers of  noble 
houses, and even contingents of  Buddhist monks.  Yet there has not 
been a great deal of  analysis of  the conditions that gave rise to private 
armies, nor whether in each conflict there were unique or similar 
conditions that lent themselves to the formation of  private military 
forces in Korea during the different periods. Because these armies 
were not a constant feature of  Korean history, the question of  why 
certain eras witnessed the rise of  private armies, while others did not, 
requires a closer examination.  
This paper argues that private armies in Korea formed as a response 
to instabilities in the central government.  As evidence, this paper looks 
at those periods in which private armies arose in Korea and analyzes 
the conditions (in the central government) during those times. There 
are three distinct historical scenarios during which private armies arose: 
when the central government was perceived as weak, when powerful 
political actors in the Korean state attempted to protect and preserve 
their existing power structure, and when foreign invasion overwhelmed 
the central government’s ability to respond to these threats. By 
organizing all the major instances of  the formation of  private armies 
into a unified narrative of  reaction to government weakness, the paper 
will demonstrate that the common element in the creation of  private 
armies was an ineffective and unstable central government.  
The first portion of  the paper will be spent creating a clear 
definition of  private army based on the degree to which a military 
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force is integrated into the formal power structure.  Private armies—
unofficial military formations not integrated into the official structure 
of  the central government—will be distinguished from paramilitaries 
who, though not regular soldiers, are part of  the government power 
structure.  In order to illustrate this distinction, case studies from 
historical and contemporary military forces will be utilized.  
defining privAte Armies
In order to understand how private armies functioned in early 
Korean society, it is first important to construct an effective definition 
of  what constitutes a private army.  Casual observers often attach a 
variety of  labels to private armies without fully understanding them. 
Phrases like “mercenary,” “militia,” and “paramilitary” are often 
used interchangeably.  This creates confusion and makes it difficult 
to assemble various military forces into an organized narrative; terms 
like “paramilitary” are substituted for both private and public armies 
both general discourse and specialist literature with little explanation. 
A review of  historical military forces suggests that the best definition 
of  a private army is a military force outside the organizational and 
command structure of  a civil government. This definition effectively 
separates the term “private armies” from other terms that may be 
inappropriately applied to these private military organizations.  
For an army to be private, it must be divorced from the public sphere 
financially and structurally.  The Peiyang Army of  Yuan Shih-k’ai, a 
Chinese private army, provides a useful example of  the distinction 
between public and private armies. Founded in 1901 by Yuan Shih-
k’ai, Governor of  China’s Chihli province, the Peiyang Army has 
been put forward as an example of  a private army because of  Yuan’s 
great control over the army, his direct decision to create the force, 
and his financing of  some of  its activities.1  Yet a closer look at the 
Peiyang Army reveals that it was in many ways a public force. It was 
expanded in size with the consent of  the Empress Dowager of  China, 
the embodiment of  the Chinese Central government, and it was raised 
largely in response to the threat to China posed by the Russo-Japanese 
War.2  
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Throughout its existence, most of  the money used to support this 
force came from the central government in Peking, which continuously 
bankrolled the expansion of  this army.3  The government supported 
this army because it carried out a legitimate public function: the 
defense of  Northern China against troubles in Manchuria.4  While the 
Peiyang Army has been used as an example of  a private army because 
of  Yuan’s high degree of  personal control over it, by this paper’s 
definition, the Peiyang army is not private army.  The clarity supplied 
by the definition in this example demonstrates its effectiveness.  If  
armies could be classified as private based on the autocratic command 
of  their leader, the term “private army” would become so broad as to 
be useless: all armies of  charismatic commanders with any degree of  
autonomy would be swept up into the definition. A review of  private 
armies that does fit the definition, the private forces common to the 
Roman Republic, are instructive of  what private armies, defined for 
the purposes of  this paper, look like.  
Private armies, disconnected from any formal state control, 
flourished during the Roman Republic.  Roman private armies, like 
those of  Pompey, were raised without the use of  state coffers, by 
private citizens like Pompey5 who lacked the kind of  formal titles Yuan 
possessed.  These private armies could be small in scale, gladiators 
and beast-fighters purchased for use against personal opponents 
in Rome.  Or, they could be as impressive as any formal army of  
the Republic. Crassus, a famous Roman political figure, elegantly 
captured the motivation behind raising these forces when he stated 
that any politician should be able to pay for an army from his own 
resources.  Utilizing disgruntled veterans, Roman political actors put 
together bodies of  men with military experience to attack their rivals 
or defend against attacks.6 These non-traditional armies of  the Roman 
Republic were private—commanded by private interests, paid for with 
private funding, and working toward individual goals.  They received no 
support from the Roman treasury, and certainly were not raised to deal 
with a threat to the Republic; their purpose was the aggrandizement of  
the faction or leader who hired them.  With this definition in place, it 
is time to consider how different military forces relate to the definition 
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of  a private army.
Paramilitary forces, irregular forces controlled by the central 
government, fall outside the definition of  private armies.  The term 
“paramilitary” sweeps in a broad range of  forces but can be accurately 
described as professional supplements or substitutes for the military 
government armies.  Indonesian armies of  1948 provide an excellent 
illustration of  what paramilitary forces are and why they fall outside 
the scope of  private armies.  The Indonesian military of  1948 was 
comprised of  a variety of  different forces including troops raised in 
the provinces of  Indonesia and troops raised from different ethnic 
groups and grouped into their own units.7 Indonesians referred to these 
irregular troops as lasker, and they were formal parts of  the army that 
were noted on military organization charts, but they were not regular 
soldiers with formalized training.  They included armed battalions 
of  the Indonesian Socialist Youth and forces of  political parties like 
Suharto’s Peta party.8 Certainly, these forces often attempted to exert 
political influence to deflect central government commands, but they 
were a formal part of  the army: when the military was considered 
for reorganization, they were considered for reorganization.  The 
difference between paramilitary and private forces is thus clear: 
paramilitary forces are recognized as an arm of  the central government 
and are (at least in theory) under its control, whereas governments 
do not maintain pretensions to control private armies even if  the 
government formally acknowledges the existence of  these forces. For 
this reason, paramilitaries have a clear position in the public-private 
army dichotomy.  
While there is a clear difference between a private army and a public 
army, the barrier that separates the two categories is not apparent 
or permanent. A public army can easily become a private one if  it 
revolts against the central government. The colonial militias of  Bahia, 
Brazil are prime examples of  this. The militias and the elites that led 
them turned against the central colonial government, and militia units 
formed the backbone of  the army that won independence for Bahia 
from the Portuguese.  These militias proved more loyal to the elites who 
led them than to the colonial government that raised them, and when 
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revolution came, were accurately identified by historians as private 
armies: “the militia Regiment of  Torre, [was] virtually the private army 
of  the great Pires de Carvalho e Albuquerque clan.”9  When the war 
for independence was successful and a new civil central government 
was formed, the militias were integrated into this new government 
and became vital in suppressing revolts against the newly established 
regime.10  They were public armies once more.  
A case study of  Melanesian armed forces serves as an excellent 
illustration both of  the definition of  private and public armies, and of  
a review of  the different types of  forces described.  The Pacific Islands 
of  the Melanesian region (Fiji, Vanuatu, etc.) maintain a variety of  
different military forces: Fiji and Papua New Guinea maintain regular 
military armies. Vanuatu on the other hand, maintains a paramilitary 
Police Field Force.  These are not professional military troops as seen 
on the other islands, but rather more heavily armed police capable of  
using military tactics; thus, by definition a public paramilitary force.11   A 
coup in the Solomon Islands in 2000 utilized police forces like these 
but also a militia force, the Malaitan Eagle force. This militia had been 
formed to protect the interests of  one of  the island’s peoples, the 
Malatians, who had come under attack from another militia force, the 
Isatabu Freedom Force.  Both of  these groups would be considered 
private militias.12  Papua New Guinea has also seen the use of  public 
mercenary forces, when, in 1997, it contracted the mercenaries 
companies Sandline International and Executive Outcomes to battle a 
secessionist movement on the island of  Bougainville, creating a public 
mercenary army.13 
Broadly speaking, three distinct types of  private armies emerged 
historically in Korea: private armies that supported rebellions against 
inept governments, private armies that protected existing power 
structures during periods of  central government instability, and private 
armies that sought to resist foreign invasion. While each of  these 
different types arose to achieve a specific goal, the causal factors in their 
rise are the same in each case: weaknesses in the central government 
created a climate in which it was necessary or favorable for private 
military forces to be available.  This trend is apparent from the first 
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use of  widespread private armies in Korea during the eight century. 
These forces were to support the rebellions that erupted because of  
the military vacuum created by the collapse of  the Silla government.
 
privAte Armies in reBeLLion
The Unified Silla government ruled a united Korea from about 670 
until 935, but as Silla’s power declined and eventually collapsed, private 
military forces emerged to fill the power vacuum.  Silla began to face 
internal discord as early as the reign of  King Hyegong (r. 765-780).  By 
767, the Korean aristocracy had become increasingly powerful and 
was able to counter reforms designed to lessen their power.  As the 
aristocracy grew in strength, the position of  the monarch became 
increasingly tenuous, so much so that in the last 155 years of  the Unified 
Silla kingdom, as many as twenty kings may have held the throne.14  As 
the political structure weakened, so did the clan system—which had 
been crucial to Silla’s stability— as well as much of  the cultural, social, 
and political framework that had allowed the Unified Silla to maintain 
their power.  Soon, the effective control of  the central government was 
reduced to the immediate region around the capitol.15  The dominion 
of  the private armies existed beyond this perimeter.  
King Hyegong’s reign saw the rise of  private armies utilized for 
rebellion against the state. In 767, a rebel army composed of  the private 
forces of  aristocrats and Korean clan chiefs forced Hyegong to repeal 
a number of  reforms that weakened their power.16  The success of  
such privatization had repercussions realized in the following century, 
dealing a serious blow to central government power in Korea.  During 
the early part of  the ninth century, Korea began to witness the more 
widespread use of  private armies. Powerful local families called “castle 
lords” or songju controlled population centers with troops based 
inheir personal fortifications.  Historical records also register them as 
“generals” or changgun because they used these villages and cities to 
raise their personal armies. Because of  the lack of  power of  the central 
magistrates sent to administer these regions, it was possible for local 
lords commanding these private armies to usurp central government 
control so as to exploit peasants for taxes and corvee (conscripted) 
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labor.17 As the central government continued to deteriorate, local 
strongmen, (hojok) and warlords began to form semi-independent fiefs 
within what was ostensibly Silla territory.18  These generals maintained 
private armies, though at the time of  their formation in the latter part 
of  the ninth century, the armies were not yet strong enough to force 
the central government from their territory.19   These nascent private 
armies would play a crucial role to the  government’s downfall.
With Silla unable to combat the proliferation of  private armies, it 
was perhaps inevitable that these forces would eventually multiply 
and grow stronger.  By the late 800s, heavy taxes from local lords had 
contributed to the formation of  new private armies in the form of  
large bandit groups throughout the kingdom.20  Drawing from the 
ranks of  peasants and slaves that the central government could no 
longer control, these brigands grew into significant armed forces.  With 
bandits destabilizing the country, warlords banded together for 
defensive purposes, joining together their smaller private armies 
to create a formidable force.21  In 892, a private rebel army turned 
public when it defeated the central government’s attempts to prevent 
it from forming the Kingdom of  Later Paekche.  This phenomenon 
was repeated in 901 with the formation of  the Kingdom of  Later 
Korguyo, which, in its later incarnation of  the Kingdom of  Koryo, 
finally overthrew the Silla in 936. The inadequate administration of  the 
central Unified Silla government provided the initial power vacuum 
that private armies would fill with a vengeance.  
Myoch’ong’s 1135 revolt serves as another example of  how 
the government’s political frailty triggered the creation of  private 
armies (of  revolt).  Nine years before Myoch’ong raised an army of  
revolution, the Koryo government had faced another revolt against the 
throne. At the time of  rebellion, the government was bitterly divided 
between two political factions arguing for different responses to the 
external threat of  the Nurchen Tartars: the monk Myoch’ong headed a 
faction supporting the movement of  the capital to the more defensible 
P’yongyang, while old noble families residing with the King wished 
to retain the old capital.22  This call for movement was itself  a sign of  
weakness. It has been postulated that while Myoch’ong’s motives for 
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Fall of  Ch’ongju to the Righteous Army of  Cho Hon and the 
warrior monks under Yonggyu, “Shrine of  the Seven Hun-
dred.” Source: Stephen R. Turnbull, The Samurai Invasion of  Ko-
rea:  1592 - 98. Oxford: Osprey Publ., 2008.
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moving were pure, the political faction backing him may have been 
using the move as a basis for the seizure of  power.23  When it became 
clear that the king would not move the capital as Myoch’ong desired, 
Myoch’ong used P’yongyang’s well resources to launch a revolt again 
the king.24
While factional struggle had sufficiently debilitated the government to 
lead to the rise of  a private army, the creation of  (the army itself) proved 
a unifying factor.  Myoch’ong called the army he raised “the Heavenly-
Sent Force of  Loyalty and Righteousness” and attempted to use his 
new army to resolve the issue of  the capital move by force.25   However, 
the chaos caused by the use of  a private army allowed the faction in 
support of  retaining the capital in its previous location to mobilize 
the forces of  the central government in their defense. Supporters of  
the move were promptly executed, and a government army marched 
on P’yongyang.26 Accounts of  the army’s success in the field vary, 
with some historians suggesting the rebels were crushed in as little as 
one month27, while others believe the army held out for as much as a 
year.28  Regardless, the defeat of  Myoch’ong’s rebellion demonstrated 
that while the weakness and division of  the central government led to 
the formation of  private armies, the unification and strength of  that 
same government could put an end to them.
Private armies of  rebellion also arose from the defection of  forces 
previously loyal to the government as the famous rebellion of  the 
Sambyolch’o against the Koryo-Mongol government demonstrates.  As 
a paramilitary police division of  the Ch’oe-controlled Koryo 
government (1198-1258), the Sambyolch’o or “Three Elite Patrols” 
were a national paramilitary force entrusted with police functions.29 
These soldiers, originally tasked with suppressing violent youth gangs 
throughout the military, were a thoroughly public force supported and 
paid for by the state treasury.30  When the Mongols invaded Korea in 
six massive incursions from 1231-1359,31 the Sambyolch’o led the Ch’oe 
government’s resistance to the Mongol invasion.  Utilizing ambushes 
and harrying strikes, the Sambyolch’o was the primary Ch’oe response to 
the Mongol invasion; they served as a private army dedicated to resisting 
the Mongol advance.  When the Ch’oe shadow dictatorship fell in 1258 
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and the reinstated king surrendered to the Mongols, the Sambyolch’o 
turned on the central government and initiated a revolt.32  The turmoil 
within the central government together with the capitulation of  the 
king to the Mongols opened the door to a political overthrow
Starved and depleted by Mongol invasion, the Ch’oe-run Koryo 
government was in a delicate state.  By the time the Ch’oe were facing 
the fifth Mongol invasion, it was already crippled from previous 
attacks: the state treasury was empty, and famine was so dire that 
the government and private granaries had to distribute grain to the 
public twice in a single year.33  Nor did the government’s troubles 
end when it capitulated to the Mongols.  The new king, Wongjong, 
was nearly dethroned in 1269 and had to be restored to power by the 
Mongols—the first time in Korean history that a Korean king was 
saved by a foreign power.34  But for the intervention of  the Mongols, 
the Sambyolch’o rebellion might have proven successful.  
Once in revolt, the Sambyolch’o behaved as a private army of  rebellion, 
striking out at a variety of  different government targets. Initially, they 
blocked all access between the central government-controlled island of  
Kanghwa where the government had fled during the Mongol invasion 
and the mainland,35 possibly in an attempt to derail the government’s 
return to the mainland and collaboration with the Mongols.36 When 
this failed, the Sambyolch’o dragooned the remaining inhabitants of  
Kanghwa into a forced migration to support their base of  operations at 
the southern end of  the Korean Peninsula.  From this base, they quickly 
seized control of  thirty islands in the area and forced the Mongols 
to divert crucial resources to dealing with this large-scale rebellion. 
After an initial offensive ground to a halt, a combined Mongol-Koryo 
force was formed that dislodged the Sambyolch’o from their main base 
at Chindo, driving them to the island of  Cheju, and then to final defeat 
in 1273. The Sambyolch’o held off  the Mongol armies for four years.37 
While this rebellion against the central government proved to be a 
failure, private armies of  rebellion would rise again during times of  
government weakness, and they would play a key role in the formation 
of  the last Korean dynasty.  
By the end of  the Koryo dynasty, the central government faced a 
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plethora of  internal and external problems that provided fertile ground 
for the development of  private armies.  One of  the main problems 
the principle government faced was the continuing raids by external 
enemies. In 1359 and 1361, a Han Chinese rebel group, the Red 
Turbans, launched large-scale raids into Korea. The second invasion of  
1361 succeeded in capturing the Korean capital. The king was forced 
to flee the city, and those buildings that survived the Mongol onslaught 
crumbled during the Red Turban invasion.38  Equally troublesome was 
a resurgence in raids by the Japanese Wako, or pirates.  These seaborne 
raiders struck at villages along the Koryo coastline and had an impact 
greatly disproportionate to their numbers and armaments, driving 
peasants away from the fertile costal territories.  The random nature of  
their raids also crippled maritime trade and prevented local taxes from 
reaching the capital, placing the aristocracy in danger of  economic 
collapse.39  But additional factors besides external raids undermined 
the central government.
Corrupt governance was a key element in the disintegration of  the 
Koryo dynasty.  By the reign of  King Kongmin (r. 1351-1374), Koryo 
power was concentrated in the hands of  a set of  powerful families 
who used the government for personal aggrandizement.  Koryo Sa, a 
contemporary record of  the time notes that in searching for a new 
advisor, Kongmin believed “that the aristocratic officials and great 
families were linked in personal cliques, mutually protecting each 
other…Since these three groups were unsuitable for employment the 
king had to obtain a man of  independence who had abandoned the 
secular world and use him extensively to correct the abuses of  the 
past.”40  Kongmin chose the monk Sin Ton, who began an extensive 
campaign of  land reform while ousting many aristocrats from their 
positions.  While this led the general population to adore and even 
revere Sin Ton as a saint, it drew the ire of  the great families and both 
Sin Ton and Kongmin were soon killed.41  As devastating to the stability 
of  the government as the external raids and internal corruption were, 
it was the political upheaval of  another country that put into place the 
mechanism by which private armies would found a new dynasty.
A new political order rose in China during the waning days of  
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Koryo: the Yuan dynasty was slowly collapsing and the Ming Dynasty 
ascended.  In 1368, Chu Yuan-chang founded the new Ming dynasty 
and continued to battle with the remnants of  the Yuan dynasty, 
requesting the aid of  the Koryo.  This broke the court into two factions, 
one supporting the Mongol Yuan dynasty, and the other supporting 
the Chinese Ming dynasty.42  When the king instituted a pro-Mongol 
policy, he was deposed by two powerful generals, Ch’oe Yong, and 
Yi Song-gye.  The new court decided on a strike at the territorial 
expansion of  the Ming in the North and appointed Ch’oe Yong to lead 
the expedition with Yi Song-gye as one of  his deputies.43  It was in this 
chaotic environment that Yi Song-gye and his private army launched 
their rebellion.
Yi Song-gye had been cultivating his private army since his early 
military campaigns. When the Koryo marched against the Red Turbans 
in 1362, 2,000 of  the 200,000 soldiers were Yi Song-gye’s private 
troops.  Korean military officials serving as Inspecting Marshals (Wonsu) 
maintained their own recruits and troop rosters (p’aegi) and Yi Song-gye 
in his capacity as a Wonsu assiduously cultivated his forces until he was 
the most powerful political actor.44  Furthermore, he disagreed with 
the planned attack on the Ming and when ordered to march on them 
in 1388, subverted his fellow deputy, Cho Min-Su, and entered into 
rebellion.45  Marching his rebel army away from the Yalu River at the 
border of  China and Korea, he deposed Ch’oe Yong and the reigning 
king, U, in a near bloodless coup. A few puppet kings followed until 
1392 when Yi Song-gye disposed of  all pretenses and made himself  
king, marking the beginning of  the Chosen dynasty.46  The private 
army of  rebellion had ushered in a new order.
The later actions of  Yi Song-gye demonstrate that private armies 
were important actors in early Korean history, not a constant feature. 
Strong Korean central governments would actively work to reduce the 
presence of  private armies throughout the kingdom.  King T’aejong 
(r. 1400-1418), one of  Yi’s successors ordered the abolition of  
private armies and armed retainers47 and by 1400 AD, this was carried 
through. Private armies were either abolished entirely or merged into 
the burgeoning national army.48  This army was an entirely public force 
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organized under the auspices of  the national command.  Later, this 
public military control was strengthened when King Sejo (r. 1455-1468) 
established a series of  large military garrisons and arms production 
centers in every province. 49  While private armies would arise later in 
response to weaknesses in the Chosen government, during this period, 
the government was sufficiently strong to occasion no need for private 
military forces, and the government made a point to disband any 
potential private armed force.
privAte Armies proteCting CentrAL power
While private armies might be used to usurp the existing political 
order, they could just as easily be used by Korea’s political elites, those 
already integrated into the power structure, to protect and strengthen 
their status and positions when the political elites felt the central 
government incapable of  or unwilling to protect their interests. A 
small but important example of  this trend during the Koryo period 
was the private armies of  Buddhist temples.  Buddhist temples, though 
centers of  religious activity, were also concentrations of  great wealth 
and political power. The Koryo king granted these temples both slaves 
and land, as did other royal family members and aristocrats seeking 
to obtain blessings and happiness from Buddha.  These donations 
accumulated until temples were powerful landlords who organized 
their own industries to produce weapons for the private armies they 
developed to protect their interests.50  These private armies of  combat-
trained monks were used when the central government was unable 
to protect the temples’ interests.  This could occur when aristocratic 
infighting created enough instability that the temples felt the need to 
support a candidate to protect their interests. But it could also happen 
when the central government needed assistance protecting Korea, and 
by extension temple property, from outside invasion. This materialized 
on a number of  occasions: an army of  warrior monks called the Subdue 
Demons Corps was mobilized to fight off  the Jurchen invasions of  
Korea51, and the monk Kim Yun-hu was responsible for forcing the 
Mongols to withdraw in 1232 after killing their commander Sartaq at 
the battle of  Ch’oin-song.52  It was under Yi-Cha-gyom in the twelfth 
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century however, that these private armies were used more frequently.
Yi Cha-gyom was a member of  the powerful Yi clan during a period 
of  central government power.  At this time, the Koryo dynasty was 
threatened by the Kin Empire of  the Nurchen Tartars.  Using highly 
mobile cavalry, the Nurchen tribes began attacking Koryo troops in 
1109. These attacks split the Koryo court into opposing factions, some 
suggesting accommodation with the Kin Empire, others demanding 
a military confrontation.53  A power struggle also existed between 
Koryo’s aristocratic families: the Kim clan, which had previously 
enjoyed a monopoly on power, was facing deteriorating influences as 
Yi-Cha-gyom’s Yi clan rose to monopolize power from 1046-1122 
in part by supplying queens to seven different kings.  To compound 
issues, the monarchy of  Koryo, the heart of  the central government, 
was in a dramatically enervated state: Yi Cha-gyom had engineered 
the removal of  one king in 1122 and replaced him with the king’s 
grandson.54 Yi was able to do this largely because of  the increasing 
prominence of  private armies of  the great clans, which were used to 
protect and advance the families’ interests.
It was in the time of  Yi Cha-gyom that private armies became key 
means by which the great families of  Korea, key political actors, protected 
their interests.  Yi pioneered the formation of  private armies.  With 
the backing of  the military hero Ch’ok Chun-gyong and his forces, Yi 
began driving political opponents from office and increasing the Yi 
clan land holdings until they held the dominant position of  power in 
the Koryo dynasty.  At this point, however, Yi Cha-gyom’s ambition 
grew too great, and he attempted open rebellion against the king, 
transitioning his private army of  protection to one of  rebellion.  His 
attempt failed55, but a trend had been set. After Yi Cha-gyom’s use of  
private armies to usurp power, great families began to use their private 
armies not just for protection but also to strengthen their positions 
by collecting “taxes” from peasants, either with the cooperation of  
government officials or in defiance of  them.  The success of  these 
private armies increased their use, and they became a defining feature 
of  the period of  instability from 1170 onward, with their origins in the 
era of  Yi Cha-gyom.56  These private armies, called sabyong,57 were not 
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in open revolt against the government, and did not attempt to replace 
the existing political order with a new power structure.  But they did 
allow the political elite of  these families to be selective in determining 
which government orders to obey.  While Yi Cha-gyom would pioneer 
the art of  the private army as a tool for of  political power, the Ch’oe 
house would be the most effective practitioner of  this art. 
Among the great families of  mid-Koryo Korea, the Ch’oe stand out 
for their use of  the private army to protect and enhance their political 
power, effectively operating as a shadow government during a time of  
central government weakness.  In 1170, a coup deposed King Uijong 
and sent him into exile.  This was the catalyst for revolts thoughout 
the country when the private armies described above took hold of  
the nation.58 Rebellion spread even to the capital when in 1198 a slave 
named Manjok attempted to rise up against the recent coup of  Ch’oe 
Chu’unghon. The Koryo Sa records his intentions: 
We will start from the hallways of  Hungguk Monastery and 
go to the polo grounds. Once all are assembled and start to 
beat drums and yell, the eunuchs in the palace will certainly 
respond.  The public slaves will take control of  the palace by 
force, and we will stage an uprising inside the capitol, first 
killing Ch’oe Ch’unghon and others.  If  each slave will kill his 
master and burn the slave registers, there will be no people of  
humble status in the country, and we can all become nobles, 
generals, and ministers.59
The rebellion was crushed, but this kind of  instability at the 
heart of  the central government was indicative of  the weakness present 
when Ch’oe Ch’ungon took tacit power and replaced King Myongjong 
with the king’s brother Sinjong in 1196.60  As the new power behind 
the throne, the Ch’oe would continue to use their private armies to 
safeguard their position as the power behind the Koryo throne.  
The Ch’oe and other powerful families used their private armies during 
this period to protect themselves and stabilize their positions. They did 
not, however, attempt to eliminate the central government: they did not 
renounce the monarchy, and they accepted the established government 
system; but the might of  Ch’oe private armies assured that Ch’oe 
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dignitaries were “consulted” by state officials in important government 
matters.61  This co-existence with the state is corroborated by the 
continued presence of  dynastic state troops of  the central government, 
whose numbers made them an important asset in protecting the rest 
of  Korea, in addition to lessening the security and patrol demands 
of  the private armies of  the Ch’oe.  These forces existed at the whim 
of  the Ch’oe, who effectively controlled all government policy, but 
were public troops supported by central government revenue.62  With 
the forces of  the central government still in place, the Ch’oe could 
concentrate on the organization and development of  their own private 
armies.
Private Ch’oe armies took a number of  different forms. While the 
sabyong of  powerful families were common in this period, a number 
of  other factions comprised the Ch’oe forces.  Many of  the Ch’oe 
forces were called retainers or mungaek.  These were armed followers, 
developed during the 1170 coup when military leaders surrounded 
themselves with small groups of  security.  Ch’oe Ch’unghon expanded 
on this until his group of  “personal retainers” numbered in the 
thousands.63  Other Ch’oe leaders raised their own forces of  personal 
retainers. Koryo Sa documents a struggle that arose between the Ch’oe 
brothers Ch’ungsu and Ch’ungon who engaged their retainers in what 
could more properly be described as a small war: 
General O Sukpi, Chun Chonsim, Pak Chongbu, and other 
said ‘We are your retainers because you have great potential 
to sway the world.  Now if  you, on the contrary, become a 
coward like this, it will mean the extermination of  us and 
our clans.’…Ch’ungsu agreed to this.  At dawn he led more 
than one thousand followers and camped at the crossroads…
Coordinating their troop formations they [Ch’unghon’s forces] 
attacked the front and the rear.  Armed with the great horned 
bows from the royal arsenal, archers fired arrows so they fell 
like rain.64
While private Ch’oe forces did occasionally skirmish with one another 
like this, the armies spent most of  their time protecting the political 
position of  the Ch’oe.
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Personal and national protection and tax collection were the 
primary functions of  private military forces like the Ch’oe’s during 
this period.  Large numbers of  Ch’oe soldiers were assigned to protect 
Ch’oe private palaces and escort Ch’oe dignitaries; the army from 
which the Ch’oe drew for this purpose soon grew from 3,000 soldiers 
to more than ten times this size.65   On a more minor scale, Koryo Sa 
tells of  how an official used his own private army for protection: “In 
fear, Kyong Taesung gathered a suicide corps of  some one hundred 
and ten people.  Stationing them at his home to deal with any incident, 
he called them the Personal Security Force.”66  Ch’oe armies also 
mobilized for national protection.  If  the central government fell, so 
would their political power. Thus, Ch’oe troops sometimes fought 
alongside government soldiers who, as Korya Sa tells, were in clear 
need of  the assistance: “At this time they were about to send troops 
to defend against the Khitans.  The bravest soldiers were all Ch’oe 
Ch’unghon’s and U’s retainers.  Those in the government army were 
all thin and weak and useless.”67  These mobilizations of  private Ch’oe 
armies to protect Ch’oe political interests were most apparent during 
the Ch’oe struggle with the Mongols.
During the war against the Mongols, Ch’oe forces fought the 
Mongols vigorously, though they did so to protect the Ch’oe power 
structure, not the central government.  As the Mongols closed in on 
the capital in 1231, Ch’oe troops put up a more effective resistance 
than the government troops not only because they were better trained, 
but also because the capital was where their homes were, the royal 
troops had less connection to the city.  Additionally, the Ch’oe were 
fearful that if  the Mongols managed to defeat them, the Mongols 
would retain the king as a puppet but drive the Ch’oe from power, just 
as the Ch’oe had done in 1198.68  But when the choice came whether 
to actually defend the capital or to withdraw, the Ch’oe actions were 
a clear reminder that these were private armies raised to protect Ch’oe 
political positions: Ch’oe U called his well-trained private troops to 
protect him as he withdrew, leaving boys and weak government troops 
to defend the capital.69  While this was a dramatic example of  how 
Ch’oe private armies always acted for Ch’oe, more mundane examples 
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of  their support of  Ch’oe political power exist.  
Tax collection and land acquisition were second functions of  the 
private armies of  both the Ch’oe and their contemporaries.  Prominent 
generals and landholders used their retainers to seize land and taxes from 
the peasants.  The Ch’oe were particularly skilled at this—all revenue 
from the entire Chunju region of  Korea was diverted to them.  This 
safeguarded their power by funding both their private army and official 
salaries the weakened central government could not pay.70  Forgotten 
in this land grab were the peasants who suffered immensely under the 
abuses of  the private armies not only of  the Ch’oe, but also of  other 
landlords who could be equally or even more cruel and avaricious than 
the Ch’oe armies.  Koryo Sa documents one such case of  abuse:
Kim Injun set up numerous estates and had his retainer Mun 
Songju control those in Cholla and retainer Chi Chun control 
those in Ch’ungch’ong.  They competed in extorting wealth 
by giving peasants one peck of  rice seed for planting, for 
which they collected one bushel of  rise at harvest.  All his sons 
imitating this, competed in assembling hoodlums and relied on 
their power to seize people’s property without restraint. The 
grievances against them were rampant.71
Private armies such as these solidified the Ch’oe political 
position by guaranteeing them resources and providing the protection 
needed to defeat armed challenge.  Using private armies for this 
purpose would persist after the demise of  the Koryo and into the Yi 
dynasty.
The year 1395 proved to turbulent for the T’aejo king of  the Yi 
dynasty.  The Ming emperor Ming T’ai Tzu was notoriously sensitive 
about the wording of  a diplomatic missive sent to him and demanded 
that its writer, Chong To Chon, be handed over to the Ming 
Court.  Chong had been a central figure in the T’aejo government 
and his departure so infuriated the court that they considered war 
against the Ming, putting troops on alert.  The death of  Ming T’ai 
Tzu in 1398 broke the diplomatic impasse, but considerable chaos was 
created.72  Adding to this tension was a growing feud about which royal 
heir would succeed the throne.  Yi Pang Won, the monarch’s fifth son, 
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had his sights on the throne, but found his brothers stood in the way.73 
This became especially true when one of  Won’s half  brothers, Pang 
sok, was named crown prince instead of  him. A sudden bout of  illness 
in King T’aejo provided Pang Won with the final element of  central 
government weakness he needed to act.74  Private armies would once 
again protect the interests of  an established political actor.  
Pang Won moved decisively with his forces to protect his political 
position. Using a private army he had amassed, he struck against 
both of  his half  brothers and eliminated both of  them, as well as 
the returned Chong To Chon, whom the king had entrusted with the 
education of  the crown prince.  Having removed these threats to his 
position, Pang Won was able to oversee the placement of  the eldest 
of  the Yi brothers, Pang Kwa, to the monarchy.75 It is important to 
note that Pang Won did not use his army to put himself  on the throne, 
but simply to protect his status against an unsuitable (in his view) 
king.  In fact, unlike the Koryo dynasty, all the private armies clashing 
in support of  succession struggles were supporting family claimants 
to the throne, not outsiders.  Indeed, these were the ultimate “political 
insiders,” connected by ties of  blood to the monarchy.76 They did not 
seek to rebel and create a new government but simply to assume a 
higher position within the current government.  It is also worth noting 
that when the succession struggles were over and the central army 
had regained its power, the private armies were disbanded; they could 
exist only with a weak central government.77  But private armies were 
not always in competition with the government: when outside forces 
threatened a weak Korea, private armies sprung up to support the 
embattled central government.
privAte Armies versus foreign invAders
The Mongol invasion met stout resistance, but the Ch’oe government 
faced endless waves of  reinforcements that eventually broke the 
central government’s power to resist, leading private armies to attempt 
to fill the resulting security gap. Even before the Mongol invasion, the 
Koryo had been experiencing increasing issues with border raiders, as 
Mongol letters to the central government reveal: “In the Year of  the 
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Rat when the Black Khitan invaded, you were not able to properly 
get rid of  them.  We sent two people, Jala and Qacin.  They came 
leading the army, took the Black Khitan and killed them all.  You 
they did not kill.  We came, for if  we had not dealt with the Black 
Khitan, you would not have been soon [in doing it].  Isn’t it so?”78 
Using the pretext of  an emissary murdered in 1219, the Mongols 
severed relations with the Koryo, and in 1231, they invaded.  Under 
attack, Koryo and Ch’oe quietly accepted Mongol rule, integrating 
themselves into the Mongol tribute system.79  This system diluted the 
authority of  the central government, whose king now had to accept 
Mongol advisors and consorts who stirred trouble in the court.  Tax 
burdens also became increasingly severe as commoners were crushed 
under a conflicting mass of  landlord, central government, and Mongol 
taxes.80  When these taxes became too onerous, the central government 
attempted revolt, only to abandon the mainland entirely in 1232 to 
fight the Mongol occupation from Kanghwa Island.  The population 
of  mainland Korea was left to fend for itself.81  Without support from 
the central government, private armies rose as the people of  Korea 
attempted to fight the invaders.
The Mongol occupation drove the formation of  numerous private 
armies seeking to defeat the invaders.  The role of  the Buddhist and 
Ch’oe private armies has already been discussed, but they were not the 
only groups to strike against the invaders.  These private armies arose 
from a number of  different sources: bandits in hiding on Mt. Kwanak 
turned themselves in and began a struggle against the Mongols; 
peasants retreated to costal islands and mountain fortresses and 
fought on; and under Chi Kwang-su a slave army defended the town 
of  Ch’unju, fighting to the end despite the fact that all the aristocratic 
officials fled.82 Koryo Sa takes particular note of  this struggle, which 
combined the private army of  slaves with the private army of  the 
Ch’oe:  “When the Mongol troops arrived, Chongju and Hongik, along 
with the yangban (aristocrat officials), abandoned the town.  The slave 
army and the Mixed Special Patrol Troops combined their strength 
and repulsed the Mongols.”83  Private armies acting in the absence of  
the central government would be a prominent feature in attempts to 
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A Japanese patrol is ambushed and pelted with stones and ar-
rows. Source: Stephen R. Turnbull, The Samurai Invasion of  Korea: 
1592 - 98. Oxford: Osprey Publ., 2008. 48. 
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combat another constant danger to Korea, the Wako.
Wako, pirate raiders, were a perennial problem for Korea, surfacing 
whenever a weakness was detected in the central government.  The 
first Wako raids occurred in 1223 AD, and they would continue 
intermittently for three centuries after that,84 though other pirates that 
had not borne the formal title of  Wako existed before this.  While 
the Koreans attributed all these raids to Japanese pirates, Wako were 
actually a variety of  peoples who engaged in part-time piracy.  This 
non-professional nature did not make them any less deadly: their 
raids forced peasants inland and caused the best costal farmland 
to fall into disuse while interrupting the flow of  costal taxes to the 
government.85  They might also be sponsored by “sea lords,” local 
dignitaries who might support their activities in order to profit from 
them,86 especially when impotent Korean governments were forced 
to pay the Wako off  to avoid their raids.87  This would be a continual 
problem for Korea but would become especially acute during the 
Mongol occupation.
Official incompetence and Mongol regulations combined to make 
the Wako raids during the fourteenth century particularly devastating 
and spurred the rise of  private armies to protect Korean territory. By 
1350, Wako raids were becoming especially debilitating because Korea, 
used to the protection of  the Mongols, found that the Mongol Yuan 
dynasty was desperately attempting to suppress rebellions in China 
and could send only a few weapons and no troops.  Additionally, 
Mongol edicts in 1278 and 1337 forbade the Koreans from building 
warships and from keeping weapons, respectively.  These provisions 
crippled the Koreans’ ability to stave off  the Wako.88  In addition to its 
military shortcomings, the Koryo central government was crippled by 
the tribute requirements placed on it by the Mongols.  The power and 
prerogatives of  the king were circumscribed, draining the authority 
of  the central government.89  Without the protection of  the central 
government, it fell to Yi Song-gye to defend his territories from the 
Wako.  Yi’s private army would eventually rebel against the central 
government, but during the 1380s, his private army, initially formed 
to fight the Red Turban bandits, would be effectively turned on the 
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Wako.90  While Yi would disband private armies when he took power, 
they would return to play a vital role in repulsing another foreign 
invader every bit as dangerous as the Mongols and the Wako; the 1592 
invasion of  Japanese leader Toyotomi Hideyoshi.  
Much like the Mongol invasions, the Japanese invasion quickly 
crippled the forces of  the central Korean government, assaulting 
Korea’s shores with overwhelming force.  On May 23, 1592, acting under 
orders from Japanese Taiko, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Konishi Yukinaga 
and So Yoshitoshi landed at Pusan with 700 ships, the vanguard of  
the most formidable invasion force in the world.91  Highly professional 
from years of  civil war and equipped with state of  the art muskets 
and artillery, the invasion army of  Hideyoshi was the largest and best 
armed in the world.  With 158,800 men in the initial expeditionary 
force, it dwarfed the Spanish Armada’s 30,000 men.  With advanced 
arquebuses, it was far more sophisticated than the poorly armed Ming 
army, the only force that could come close to matching it in size.92  It 
is questionable how many nations could have effectively resisted this 
onslaught but Korea faced particular difficulties.  By the sixteenth 
century, Korea’s military was sub-par and quickly collapsed in the face 
of  Japanese attacks. Following one battle, the Koreans reported of  
the Japanese, “The enemy we faced today could be called immortal 
soldiers.  Normal men can’t stand up to them in battle.”93  Korean forces 
were driven back and the king, Sonjo, was forced to flee city after city 
until he and his court were a mere 150 miles from the Chinese border, 
and contemplating abandoning Korea for China altogether.  With the 
forces of  the central government in retreat, it fell to the people of  
Korea to resist the invasion, and as during the time of  the Mongols, 
private armies responded.
As in the Mongol invasion, private armies assisting the central 
government in repulsing the Japanese came from a variety of  sources 
and were led by a panoply of  colorful characters.  These private forces 
were called uibyong, or righteous armies, and many were raised by local 
aristocrats or landowners who had the wealth necessary to outfit these 
forces.94  These were the armies of  men like Kwak Chae-u, also called 
“Heaven Descending Red Coat General” for the red garments he wore, 
70     Sam Bieler 
Early Korean Armies
dyed with the first menstrual blood of  girls. Raising an army of  one 
thousand soldiers paid for out of  his own money, Kwak led his army 
on raids against the Japanese throughout Kyongsang  province.  His 
private army was far more dedicated to the war against the Japanese 
than were the government soldiers that sometimes accompanied 
him.  During their siege of  Kumsan, when the Japanese opened fire, 
the government soldiers broke and ran even as Kwak’s men held, 
thus costing him the battle.95  While Kwak’s exploits were particularly 
famous, his story, that of  an upper-class aristocrat raising a personal 
force to fight the Japanese, was repeated throughout many Korean 
provinces.  These forces eventually crippled Japan’s ability to effectively 
exploit and occupy Korea.  Additionally, Buddhist monks joined the 
battle against the Japanese.  No longer the political force they had 
been during the Koryo dynasty, there were no temple-based private 
armies, but eight thousand monks rose to answer the monk Hyujong’s 
impassioned call to arms: 
“Hold high your banners, all you monk-soldiers of  the eight 
provinces!  Who among you have not been given birth by the 
land…Abandoning a just cause and swerving from the right 
path in order merely to survive in hiding-how can this be the 
proper way?”96
These private forces would be a constant thorn in the side of  
the Japanese, crippling occupational governments and cutting supply 
lines, providing Korea and China with the precious time they needed 
to build their strength and gather the government forces necessary to 
repulse the Japanese.  The private armies of  resistance gave Korea its 
freedom.
ConCLusion
This paper does not, and could not provide a canonical list of  the 
private armies that existed during Korea’s long history. What this paper 
has tried to do is provide a framework for understanding the conditions 
under which private armies in Korea arose, and a methodology for 
organizing these armies into a coherent narrative by giving a clear 
definition of  private armies and creating a typology that allows for their 
organization.  To this end examples have been provided of  a diverse 
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array private armies throughout early Korean history, and it has been 
demonstrated that central government weakness was the catalyst in 
each of  these cases for the creation of  these private armies.  A perfect 
example are the forces bearing the name uibyong resurfaced in the late 
1800s and early 1900s when the Japanese again attempted to invade 
and occupy Korea. These forces reemerged hundreds of  years after the 
examples provided here but arose in response to central government 
weakness to Japanese invasion.  This suggests that these private armies 
had not only political and military effects on Korean history, but also 
an impact on the national imagination and consciousness.
From this starting point there are a super-abundance of  avenues for 
future research on this topic.  There are many more private armies in 
Korean history against which the robustness of  this theory can be 
tested.  Just as importantly, the definition of  private army itself  can be 
examined and refined.  All of  this will serve to better illuminate the 
catalysts for the creation of  private armies and define the pivotal role 
these forces played in Korean history.
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